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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the past few decades, Jewish legal theory has gained increas-
ing prominence as both an area of study and a field of scholarship in 
the American legal academy.
1
  Dozens of American law schools in-
clude courses on Jewish law in the curriculum.
2
  Several law schools 
have established centers dedicated to the study of Jewish law,
3
 while 
 
 ∗ Professor of Law, Pepperdine University.  As of August 1, 2010, the author will 
be Professor of Law & Director of the Jewish Law Institute, Touro Law Center.  An 
earlier version of this Essay was presented as a Plenary Address at the conference Re-
ligious Legal Theory: The State of the Field, held at Seton Hall University School of 
Law, November 12–13, 2009.  I thank the conference organizers, Angela Carmella, 
John Coverdale, and David Opderbeck, for inviting me to address the conference, 
and I thank the conference participants for helpful comments and conversations.  I 
also thank the faculties at Pepperdine Law School and Touro Law Center for their 
encouragement.  Finally, I thank Fraida Liba, Yehudah, Aryeh, Rachel, and Shira. 
 1 Samuel J. Levine, Emerging Applications of Jewish Law in American Legal Scholar-
ship: An Introduction, 23 J.L. & RELIGION 43, 43 & n.1 (2007). 
 2 See generally Sherman L. Cohn, Yale Rosenberg: The Scholar and the Teacher of Jewish 
Law, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 872 (2002); Samuel J. Levine, Teaching Jewish Law in American 
Law Schools: An Emerging Development in Law and Religion, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1041 
(1999); [hereinafter Levine, Teaching Jewish Law]; Samuel J. Levine, Teaching Jewish 
Law in American Law Schools—Part II: An Annotated Syllabus, 2 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 1 (2002) [hereinafter Levine, Teaching Jewish Law, Part II]; Edward H. Ra-
bin, Symposium: The Evolution and Impact of Jewish Law—Foreword, 1 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L 
L. & POL’Y 49 (1995); Jeffrey I. Roth, Fraud on the Surviving Spouse in Jewish and Ameri-
can Law: A Model Chapter for a Jewish Law Casebook, 28 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L. L. 101 
(1996); Alan M. Sokobin, A Program in Comparative Jewish Law, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 795 
(2002). 
 3 These institutes include The DePaul University College of Law Center for Jew-
ish Law & Judaic Studies; The Institute of Jewish Law, Boston University School of 
Law; The Institute of Jewish Law, Touro College/Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center; 
The Yeshiva University Center for Jewish Law and Contemporary Civilization, Cardo-
zo School of Law; and The Tikvah Center for Law & Jewish Civilization, New York 
University.  See Boston Univ. Sch. of Law, Centers & Institutes, http://www.bu.edu/ 
law/directory/centers.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2010); Ctr. for Jewish Law & Con-
temporary Civilization at Cardozo Sch. of Law, Yeshiva Univ., 
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other schools include discussions of Jewish law as an important com-
ponent of centers and programs on law and religion.
4
  The promi-
nence of Jewish legal theory in American legal scholarship has been 
even more pronounced, giving rise to an extensive body of literature 
exploring both Jewish law on its own terms and its potential applica-
tions to American law.
5
 
In light of these developments, this Essay briefly considers the 
current state of the field of Jewish law and Jewish legal theory within 
the context of the American legal academy.  Specifically, the Essay 
suggests that it may be instructive to step back and focus on a metho-
dological assessment of these developments, taking into account a 
number of salient features of the Jewish legal model.  These aspects 
of Jewish law both complicate and enrich the application of Jewish 
legal perspectives to issues of American law and public policy. 
First, the Jewish legal system has developed over the course of 
thousands of years, functioning within a broad range of societal and 
geographical settings, amidst benign and, all-too-often, belligerent 
and oppressive circumstances.
6
  This historical experience has re-
 
http://www.cardozo.yu.edu/cjl/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2010); Ctr. for Jewish Law & Ju-
daic Studies, DePaul Univ. Coll. of Law, http://www.law.depaul.edu/ 
centers_institutes/jljs/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2010); Jewish Law Inst., Touro Law Cen-
ter, http://www.tourolaw.edu/academic_programs/institutes/jewish_law_ 
institute.asp (last visited Mar. 6, 2010); Tikvah Ctr. for Law & Jewish Civilization, 
NYU Institutes on the Park, http://www.nyutikvah.org/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2010). 
 4 These programs include The Center for the Study of Law and Religion, Emory 
University School of Law; The Institute on Religion, Law & Lawyer’s Work, Fordham 
University School of Law; The Herbert and Elinor Nootbaar Institute on Law, Reli-
gion, and Ethics, Pepperdine University School of Law.  See INST. ON RELIGION, LAW & 
LAWYER’S WORK, FORDHAM LAW SCH., PROMOTING THE INTEGRATION OF RELIGIOUS 
VALUES INTO THE PRACTICE OF LAW 1, available at http://law.fordham.edu/ 
assets/LawReligion/Law_Religion_brochure.pdf; Emory Univ. Sch. of Law, The Cen-
ter for the Study of Law and Religion: Mission & History, http://cslr.law.emory.edu/ 
about-cslr/mission-history/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2010); Pepperdine Univ. Sch. of Law, 
Herbert and Elinor Nootbaar Institute on Law, Religion, and Ethics, 
http://law.pepperdine.edu/nootbaar/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2010). 
 5 See generally Levine, supra note 1; Samuel J. Levine, Jewish Legal Theory and Amer-
ican Constitutional Theory: Some Comparisons and Contrasts, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
441, 442–43 & nn.3–11 (1997) [hereinafter Levine, Jewish Legal Theory and American 
Constitutional Theory]; Levine, Teaching Jewish Law, supra note 2; Levine, Teaching Jew-
ish Law, Part II, supra note 2; Suzanne Last Stone, In Pursuit of the Counter-Text: The 
Turn to the Jewish Legal Model in Contemporary American Legal Theory, 106 HARV. L. REV. 
813 (1993).  
 6 See AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY AND SOURCES OF JEWISH LAW, at xvi (N.S. 
Hecht et al. eds., 1996); 1 MENACHEM ELON, JEWISH LAW: HISTORY, SOURCES, 
PRINCIPLES: HA-MISHPAT HA-IVRI 1 (Bernard Auerbach & Melvin J. Sykes trans., The 
Jewish Publ’n Soc’y 1994) (1988). 
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sulted in the production of a voluminous library of legal literature, 
with contributions from virtually every generation and, over time, 
nearly all parts of the world.
7
  Therefore, an attempt to consider the 
approach of the Jewish legal system to an issue of significance in the 
American legal system might require an initial effort to grapple with 
the various primary and secondary sources of Jewish law that address 
the issue directly and indirectly.  Through the course of millennia—
and up to this day—scholars have explored Jewish law on its own 
terms, providing instrumental and arguably indispensible studies and 
insights into ways Jewish law might help illuminate contemporary 
American legal thought. 
Second, the Jewish legal system addresses nearly every aspect of 
human endeavor, from the seemingly mundane to the profound, 
from ritual to interpersonal activities, from civil and commercial law 
to criminal law.
8
  The scope of the Jewish legal system not only adds 
 
 7 For helpful introductions to the history, sources, and structure of Jewish law, 
see AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY AND SOURCES OF JEWISH LAW, supra note 6; 
IRVING A. BREITOWITZ, BETWEEN CIVIL LAW AND RELIGIOUS LAW: THE PLIGHT OF THE 
AGUNAH IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 307–13 (1993); MENACHEM ELON ET AL., JEWISH LAW 
(MISHPAT IVRI): CASES AND MATERIALS (1999); 1 ELON, supra note 6; DAVID M. 
FELDMAN, BIRTH CONTROL IN JEWISH LAW: MARITAL RELATIONS, CONTRACEPTION, AND 
ABORTION AS SET FORTH IN THE CLASSIC TEXTS OF JEWISH LAW 3–18 (1968); JEWISH LAW 
AND LEGAL THEORY (Martin P. Golding ed., 1993); ARYEH KAPLAN, THE ARYEH KAPLAN 
READER 211–19 (1985); AARON KIRSCHENBAUM, EQUITY IN JEWISH LAW: HALAKHIC 
PERSPECTIVES IN LAW: FORMALISM AND FLEXIBILITY IN JEWISH CIVIL LAW app. at 289–304 
(1991); NAHUM RAKOVER, A GUIDE TO THE SOURCES OF JEWISH LAW (1994); AARON M. 
SCHREIBER, JEWISH LAW AND DECISION-MAKING: A STUDY THROUGH TIME (1979); Mena-
chem Elon, The Legal System of Jewish Law, 17 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 221 (1985); Ste-
ven F. Friedell, Aaron Kirschenbaum on Equity in Jewish Law, 1993 BYU L. REV. 909 
(book review).  
 8 See, e.g., ARYEH KAPLAN, THE HANDBOOK OF JEWISH THOUGHT ¶¶ 5:61–62, at 78 
(1979) (“The . . . commandments . . . penetrate every nook and cranny of a person’s 
existence, hallowing even the lowliest acts and elevating them to a service to God. . . . 
[T]he multitude of laws . . . sanctify every facet of life, and constantly remind one of 
[one’s] responsibility toward God.”); JOSEPH B. SOLOVEITCHIK, HALAKHIC MAN 20, 22 
(Lawrence Kaplan trans., Jewish Publ’n Soc’y of Am. 1983) (1944) (observing that 
“[t]here is no phenomenon, entity, or object in this concrete world” beyond the 
grasp of halacha, and noting that “just a few of the multitude of halakhic [halachic] 
subjects” include “sociological creations: the state, society, and the relationship of 
individuals within a communal context”; “laws of business, torts, neighbors, plaintiff 
and defendant, creditor and debtor, partners, agents, workers, artisans, bailees”; 
“[f]amily life”; “[w]ar, the high court, courts and the penalties they impose”; and 
“psychological problems . . . .”); id. at 93–94 (explaining that Halacha (i.e., Jewish 
law) “does not differentiate between the [person] who stands in [the] house of wor-
ship, engaged in ritual activities, and the mortal who must wage the arduous battle of 
life”; rather it “declares that [a person] stands before God not only in the synagogue 
but also in the public domain, in [one’s] house, while on a journey, while lying down 
LEVINE (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 6/21/2010  6:04 PM 
936 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:933 
 
to the volume of legal material that constitutes the corpus of Jewish 
law but also serves as a reminder of the underlying religious character 
of the Jewish legal system, premised upon express and implicit theo-
logical principles that infuse and affect the function of the law.
9
  Al-
though it is possible to debate the extent to which, as both a descrip-
tive and normative matter, religion informs American law,
10
 it is not 
plausible to picture the American legal system as a consciously reli-
gious—let alone Jewish—system of law.  Therefore, in addition to 
challenges that generally confront attempts to apply the laws of for-
eign legal systems in the context of American law,
11
 greater challenges 
 
and rising up,” and that “[t]he marketplace, the street, the factory, the house, the 
meeting place, the banquet hall, all constitute the backdrop for the religious life”); 
Moshe Silberg, Law and Morals in Jewish Jurisprudence, 75 HARV. L. REV. 306, 322 
(1961) (“The . . . mode of dress, . . . diet, dwelling, behavior, relation with [others], . 
. . family affairs, and . . . business affairs were all prefixed and premolded, in a na-
tional cloak, in a set of laws that was clear, severe, strict, detailed, that accompanied 
[an individual] day by day, from cradle to grave.”); see also Samuel J. Levine, The 
Broad Life of the Jewish Lawyer: Integrating Spirituality, Scholarship and Profession, 27 TEX. 
TECH L. REV. 1199, 1199 (1996) (“The religious individual faces the constant chal-
lenge of reconciling religious ideals with the mundane realities of everyday life. In-
deed, it is through the performance of ordinary daily activities that a person can truly 
observe such religious duties as serving G-d and loving one’s neighbor.”).  
 9 See, e.g., Introduction to JEWISH LAW AND LEGAL THEORY, supra note 7, at xiii, xiii; 
Menachem Elon, The Legal System of Jewish Law, 17 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 221, 227 
(1985).  
 10 For discussions of the relationship between religion and American law and pol-
itics, see ROBERT AUDI, RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT AND SECULAR REASON (2000); STEPHEN 
L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE 
RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993); KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC 
REASONS (1995); KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 
(1988); MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALITY IN 
AMERICAN POLITICS (1991); MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW (1988); 
MICHAEL J. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND MORAL PERSPECTIVES 
(1997); RELIGION AND CONTEMPORARY LIBERALISM (Paul J. Weithman ed., 1997); Su-
zanna Sherry, Religion and the Public Square: Making Democracy Safe for Religious Minori-
ties, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 499 (1998); Symposium, Law and Morality, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L. 
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 1 (1984); Symposium, Religion and the Judicial Process: Legal, Ethi-
cal, and Empirical Dimensions, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 177 (1998); Symposium, Religion in the 
Public Square, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 647 (2001); Symposium on Religion in the Public 
Square, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 307 (2003); Symposium, Religiously 
Based Morality: Its Proper Place in American Law and Public Policy, 36 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 217 (2001); Symposium, The Role of Religion in Public Debate in a Liberal Society, 30 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 849 (1993); Ruti Teitel, A Critique of Religion as Politics in the Public 
Sphere, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 747 (1993). 
 11 The ongoing debate among prominent justices, judges, and scholars over re-
liance on foreign authority in American constitutional interpretation provides a 
poignant illustration of some of the complexities confronting efforts to apply foreign 
law in the context of the American legal system.  See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
551, 567, 576–78 (2005); id. at 622–28 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
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may face any effort to apply concepts from a religious legal system, in 
particular the Jewish legal system. 
These characteristics of Jewish law may suggest the need to em-
ploy an effective methodology for applying a given principle from 
Jewish legal theory to American law and public policy.  Specifically, 
such an analysis may require a methodology that: (a) carefully and 
accurately depicts the principle, as understood within Jewish legal 
theory, in a way that is faithful to the Jewish legal system; (b) consid-
ers carefully the extent to which the principle incorporates theologi-
cal underpinnings that are particular to the Jewish legal model and, 
accordingly, may not be suitable in the context of the American legal 
model; and (c) applies the lessons from the Jewish legal system only 
to the extent that they make sense within the internal logic of the 
American legal system, thus remaining faithful to American jurispru-
dence as well. 
This Essay illustrates the promise and potential limitations posed 
by this methodology through a close look at perhaps the most prom-
inent references to Jewish law in the history of the American legal sys-
 
U.S. 558, 576–77 (2003); id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 
304, 316 n.21 (2002); id. at 324–25 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Roger P. Alford, In 
Search of a Theory for Constitutional Comparativism, 52 UCLA L. REV. 639 (2005); Ste-
phen Breyer, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Keynote Address at the Ninety-
Seventh Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Apr. 4, 
2003), in 97 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 265, 265–66 (2003); Steven G. Calabresi, “A 
Shining City on a Hill”: American Exceptionalism and the Supreme Court’s Practice of Relying 
on Foreign Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1335 (2006); Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreign Sources and 
the American Constitution, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 223 (2006); David Fontana, Re-
fined Comparativism in Constitutional Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 539 (2001); Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, A Decent Respect to the Opinions of 
[Human]kind: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudica-
tion, Keynote Address at the Ninety-Ninth Annual Meeting of the American Society 
of International Law (Apr. 1, 2005), in 99 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 351, 355 (2005); 
Vicki Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 109 (2005); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., “I’d Like To Teach the World To 
Sing (In Perfect Harmony)”: International Judicial Dialogue and the Muses—Reflections on 
the Perils and the Promise of International Judicial Dialogue, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1321, 1322–
25, 1335–36, 1356–58 (2006); John O. McGinnis, Foreign to Our Constitution, 100 NW. 
U. L. REV. 303 (2006); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59 
STAN. L. REV. 131 (2006); Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. 31 (2005); Symposium, Global Constitutionalism, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1153 (2007); 
Mark Tushnet, When Is Knowing Less Better Than Knowing More? Unpacking the Contro-
versy over Supreme Court Reference to Non-U.S. Law, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1275 (2006); Melis-
sa A. Waters, Getting Beyond the Crossfire Phenomenon: A Militant Moderate’s Take on the 
Role of Foreign Authority in Constitutional Interpretation, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 635 (2008); 
Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of Transnational Judicial Dialo-
gue in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 GEO. L.J. 487 (2005).   
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tem: the Supreme Court of the United States’s citations to the rule 
against self-incrimination in Jewish law.
12
  In particular, this Essay 
 
 12 See Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 497 n.5 (1967); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436, 458 n.27 (1966).  For examples of other American cases citing Jewish law in 
the context of discussions of self-incrimination, see United States v. Gecas, 120 F.3d 
1419, 1425 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Huss, 482 F.2d 38, 51 (2d Cir. 1973); 
Moses v. Allard, 779 F. Supp. 857, 870 (E.D. Mich. 1991); Roberts v. Madigan, 702 F. 
Supp. 1505, 1517 n.20 (D. Colo. 1989); In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1300 (D. Nev. 
1983); State v. McCloskey, 446 A.2d 1201, 1208 n.4 (N.J. 1982); People v. Brown, 86 
Misc. 2d 339, 487 n.5 (N.Y. Nassau County Ct. 1975). 
For examples of references to the Jewish law of self-incrimination in American 
legal scholarship, see LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE 
RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 433–41 (2d ed., Macmillan Publ’g Co. 1986) 
(1968); Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective, in R. H. 
HELMHOLZ ET AL.,THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION: ITS ORIGINS AND 
DEVELOPMENT 181, 279 n.28 (1997); Cheryl G. Bader, “Forgive Me Victim for I Have 
Sinned”: Why Repentance and the Criminal Justice System Do Not Mix—A Lesson from Jewish 
Law, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 69, 88 (2003); Isaac Braz, The Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination in Anglo-American Law: The Influence of Jewish Law, in JEWISH LAW AND 
CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 161 (Nahum Rakover ed., 1984); Debra Ciardiello, Seeking 
Refuge in the Fifth Amendment: The Applicability of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination to 
Individuals Who Risk Incrimination Outside the United States, 15 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 722, 
725 (1992); Suzanne Darrow-Kleinhaus, The Talmudic Rule Against Self-Incrimination 
and the American Exclusionary Rule: A Societal Prohibition Versus an Affirmative Individual 
Right, 21 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 205 (2002); Malvina Halberstam, The Ratio-
nale for Excluding Incriminating Statements: U.S. Law Compared to Ancient Jewish Law, in 
JEWISH LAW AND CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra, at 177; George Horowitz, The Privi-
lege Against Self-Incrimination—How Did It Originate?, 31 TEMP. L.Q. 121, 125 (1958); 
Samuel J. Levine, An Introduction to Self-Incrimination in Jewish Law, with Application to 
the American Legal System: A Psychological and Philosophical Analysis, 28 LOY. L.A. INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 257 (2006) [hereinafter Levine, An Introduction to Self-Incrimination in 
Jewish Law]; Samuel J. Levine, Miranda, Dickerson, and Jewish Legal Theory: The Consti-
tutional Rule in a Comparative Analytical Framework, 69 MD. L. REV. 78 (2009) [hereinaf-
ter Levine, Miranda, Dickerson, and Jewish Legal Theory]; Simcha Mandelbaum, The 
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Anglo-American and Jewish Law, 5 AM. J. COMP. L. 
115, 116–18 (1956); Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, In the Beginning: 
The Talmudic Rule Against Self-Incrimination, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 955 (1988); Aaron M. 
Schreiber, The Jurisprudence of Dealing with Unsatisfactory Fundamental Law: A Compara-
tive Glance at the Different Approaches in Medieval Criminal Law, Jewish Law and the United 
States Supreme Court, 11 PACE L. REV. 535, 550 (1991); Daniel J. Seidmann & Alex 
Stein, The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent: A Game Theoretic Analysis of the Fifth 
Amendment Privilege, 114 HARV. L. REV. 431, 452 n.70 (2000); Michelle M. Sharoni, A 
Journey of Two Countries: A Comparative Study of the Death Penalty in Israel and South Afri-
ca, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 257, 263 (2001); Erica Smith-Klocek, A Halach-
ic Perspective on the Parent-Child Privilege, 39 CATH. LAW. 105, 109 (1999); Gregory 
Thomas Stremers, The Self-Incrimination Clause and the Threat of Foreign Prosecution in 
Bankruptcy Proceedings: A Comment on Moses v. Allard, 70 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 847, 
854–55 (1993); Bernard Susser, Worthless Confessions: The Torah Approach, 130 NEW L.J. 
1056 (1980). 
For a general survey and analysis of references to Jewish law in American judicial 
opinions, see BERNARD J. MEISLIN, JEWISH LAW IN AMERICAN TRIBUNALS (1976); Daniel 
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compares the Court’s reliance on Jewish law in the landmark 1966 
case of Miranda v. Arizona,
13
 with the Court’s reference to Jewish law 
less than one year later in Garrity v. New Jersey.
14
  This Essay argues 
that, in contrast to Miranda, which relies upon a largely mechanical 
reference to religious principles in Jewish law, Garrity employs a more 
conceptual methodology, exploring the conceptual underpinnings of 
Jewish law and, accordingly, drawing more insightful lessons to be 
applied in the context of the American legal system.  Building on this 
distinction, this Essay examines  applications of Jewish legal theory in 
a variety of areas of contemporary American legal scholarship.  This 
Essay concludes that, similar to the Court’s approach in Garrity, 
American legal theory draws important insights from Jewish legal 
theory through scholarship that employs a conceptual methodology 
for the application of principles in Jewish law. 
II. MIRANDA V. ARIZONA: LIMITATIONS OF THE APPLICATION OF JEWISH 
LEGAL THEORY IN AMERICAN LAW 
In the landmark case of Miranda v. Arizona, Section II of Chief 
Justice Earl Warren’s majority opinion begins, “We sometimes forget 
how long it has taken to establish the privilege against self-
incrimination, the sources from which it came and the fervor with 
which it was defended.”
15
  Before launching into a historical survey, 
starting with the events of the Star Chamber in 1637, the opinion as-
serts that the “roots” of the privilege against self-incrimination “go 
back into ancient times.”
16
  The opinion documents this assertion 
with a footnote stating, “Thirteenth century commentators found an 
analogue to the privilege grounded in the Bible.”
17
  The footnote 
quotes a translation of a ruling found in Maimonides’ Code of Law: 
“To sum up the matter, the principle that no man is to be declared 
 
G. Ashburn, Appealing to a Higher Authority?: Jewish Law in American Judicial Opinions, 
71 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 295 (1994); Charles Auerbach, The Talmud—A Gateway to the 
Common Law, 3 W. RES. L. REV. 5 (1951); Bernard J. Meislin, Jewish Law in America, in 
THE JEWISH LAW ANNUAL: JEWISH LAW IN LEGAL HISTORY AND THE MODERN WORLD 
(Bernard S. Jackson ed., Supp. II 1980); Bernard J. Meislin, Jewish Law in American 
Tribunals, 7 ISR. L. REV. 349 (1972). 
 13 384 U.S. 436, 458 n.27.   
 14 385 U.S. 493, 497 n.5. 
 15 384 U.S. at 458. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. at 458 n.27. 
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guilty on his own admission is a divine decree.”
18
  Finally, the footnote 
concludes: “See also Lamm, The Fifth Amendment and Its Equivalent 
in the Halakhah, 5 Judaism 53 (Winter 1956).”
19
 
Miranda’s reliance on Jewish law, in this manner, is notable for a 
number of reasons.  First, Miranda presents us with the phenomenon 
of one of the most influential Chief Justices of the United States start-
ing a crucial section of the majority opinion of one of the most im-
portant Fifth Amendment decisions in the history of the United 
States—and one of the most famous decisions in any area of law—
with a reference to Jewish law. 
Second, the opinion is careful to describe Jewish law on its own 
terms, quoting directly from Maimonides to provide an accurate de-
piction of the law within the Jewish legal system.  As the quotation 
makes clear, Jewish law includes an absolute ban on the admissibility 
of confessions as evidence against criminal defendants.
20
  In further 
reliance on Maimonides, the opinion accepts the characterization of 
this rule as ancient, which is consistent with the understanding of the 
rule within Jewish legal tradition.
21
 
Third, in further fidelity to Jewish law, rather than citing to a law 
review article or the work of an American lawyer, the footnote cites to 
the work of scholars of Jewish law through the Code of Law of Maimo-
nides, a comprehensive restatement of the entire corpus of Jewish law 
written by one of the most important Medieval scholars of Jewish law 
and philosophy,
22
 and an article written by Rabbi Norman Lamm, a 
leading twentieth century scholar of Jewish law and philosophy and 
later president of Yeshiva University, less than a decade before Miran-
da was decided.
23
 
 
 18 Id. (quoting Laws Concerning the Sanhedrin and the Penalties Within Their Jurisdic-
tion, in THE CODE OF MAIMONIDES (MISHNEH TORAH): BOOK FOURTEEN: THE BOOK OF 
JUDGES treatise 1, ch. 18, ¶ 6, at 53 (3 YALE JUDAICA SERIES, Julian Obermann et al. 
eds., Abraham M. Hershman trans., 1977) (1949)). 
 19 Id. (italics added). 
 20 Id.  
 21 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458 n.27. 
 22 For a discussion of Maimonides and the Mishneh Torah, see ISADORE TWERSKY, 
INTRODUCTION TO THE CODE OF MAIMONIDES (MISHNEH TORAH) (22 YALE JUDAICA 
SERIES, Leon Nemoy et al. eds., 1980). 
 23 For a biography of Rabbi Lamm and a bibliography of his scholarship, see Ye-
shiva Univ., Our Speakers and Authors: Rosh HaYeshiva Norman Lamm, 
http://www.yutorah.org/speakers/speaker.cfm/80106/Rosh%20HaYeshiva_Norma
n_Lamm (last visited May 12, 2010). 
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Nevertheless, some questions may arise as to the Miranda Court’s 
methodology in applying Jewish law.  Miranda famously established 
the Miranda warnings as a means toward preventing coerced confes-
sions.
24
  The Court delineated in great detail a number of interroga-
tion methods widely in use at the time, finding that the function—if 
not the design—of many of these methods was to produce conditions 
under which a suspect was subject to both subtle and more blatant 
forms of psychological coercion.
25
  Thus, the confessions obtained 
through these methods could not be deemed sufficiently voluntary to 
satisfy the requirements of the Constitution.
26
 
In setting forth such a landmark rule, which was to prove in 
many ways both revolutionary and controversial,
27
 the Court looked to 
offer historical support for its conclusions.  The Court’s reference to 
the Star Chamber
28
 seems quite apt, both as a representation of the 
kind of coercion the Court was determined to prevent and as an illu-
stration of the abuses that, as a historical matter, gave rise to the pro-
tections incorporated into the Fifth Amendment. 
In contrast, the reference to—and at least partial reliance on—
the rule of criminal confessions in Jewish law seems substantively, 
conceptually, and historically misplaced.  Most basically, as the foot-
note in Miranda acknowledges, the Jewish legal system prescribes an 
 
 24 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467–79. 
 25 See id. at 448–56. 
 26 See id. at 457–58. 
 27 In addition to the sharp concurring and dissenting opinions offered in re-
sponse to the Miranda Court’s majority opinion, see id. at 499 (Clark, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part); id. at 504 (Harlan, J., dissenting); id. at 536 (White, J., 
dissenting), the decision has prompted ongoing debate among both Supreme Court 
Justices, see, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), and scholars over 
both the Court’s methodology and the outcome of the case.  See, e.g., Evan H. Ca-
minker, Miranda and Some Puzzles of “Prophylactic” Rules, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (2001); 
Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417 (1985); Paul G. Cas-
sell, All Benefits, No Costs: The Grand Illusion of Miranda’s Defenders, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 
1084 (1996); Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowls, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Pers-
pective on Miranda’s Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055 (1998); 
Joseph D. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of Article III Legiti-
macy, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 100 (1985); Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court (Was It Really So 
Defense-Minded?), The Burger Court (Is It Really So Prosecution-Oriented?), and Police Inves-
tigatory Practices, in THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN’T 62, 
82 (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda’s Practical Effect: Substan-
tial Benefits and Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 500 (1996); Stephen J. 
Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435 (1987); David A. Strauss, 
The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190 (1988); Symposium, Miranda 
After Dickerson: The Future of Confession Law, 99 MICH. L. REV. 879 (2001).  
 28 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458–59 (1966).  
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absolute ban on the admissibility of a criminal defendant’s self-
incriminating statements.
29
  In stark contrast, pursuant to the rule es-
tablished in Miranda, interrogation of criminal defendants remains 
among the most important and effective tools of law enforcement, 
and voluntary criminal confessions remain among the most valuable 
pieces of prosecutorial evidence.  It seems anomalous to rely on a le-
gal system with an outright ban on criminal confessions in support of 
a rule that fully accepts criminal confessions, as long as they are not 
the product of coercion. 
As a conceptual matter, Miranda’s reliance on Jewish law seems 
ill-suited for application in the American legal system.  Notably, Mai-
monides offers possible rationales for the ban on criminal confes-
sions in Jewish law, rooted in psychological and philosophical insights 
into the human condition.
30
  Strikingly, however, rather than apply-
ing these more accessible reasons for the rule, the Supreme Court 
quoted exclusively from Maimonides’ conclusion that, ultimately, the 
ban on criminal confessions stands as a “divine decree.”
31
  The theo-
logical expression of a rule in Jewish law, premised on divine authori-
ty, does not translate to the American legal system.
32
  The Miranda 
Court fails to offer an explanation as to why American law should ac-
cord even persuasive authority to a religious rule, and does not iden-
tify a rationale for the rule that would prove applicable in the context 
of the logic of the American legal system. 
Finally, to the extent that the Court was merely referencing Jew-
ish law as part of the historical establishment of “the privilege against 
 
 29 See id. at 458 n.27.   
 30 See Laws Concerning the Sanhedrin and the Penalties Within Their Jurisdiction, supra 
note 18, treatise 1, ch. 18, ¶ 6, at 53.  
[I]t is possible that [the confessor] was confused in mind when he 
made the confession.  Perhaps he was one of those who are in misery, 
bitter in soul, who long for death, thrust the sword into their bellies or 
cast themselves down from the roofs.  Perhaps this was the reason that 
prompted him to confess to a crime he had not committed, in order 
that he might be put to death.   
Id.  For more complete discussions of the psychological analysis provided by Maimo-
nides and its potential application to the American legal system, see Norman Lamm, 
The 5th Amendment and Its Equivalent in Jewish Law, DECALOGUE J., 1, Jan.–Feb. 1967, at 
1, 11–12; Levine, An Introduction to Self-Incrimination in Jewish Law, supra note 12, at 
266–76. 
 31 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458 n.27 (quoting Laws Concerning the Sanhedrin and the 
Penalties Within Their Jurisdiction, supra note 18, ch. 18, ¶ 6, at 53).  
 32 To use an admittedly overstated analogy, we would not accept an argument 
that the United States should allow only kosher food because in the Jewish legal sys-
tem, based on divine decree, only kosher food is permitted. 
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self-incrimination,”
33
 there is scant evidence of a direct historical 
connection between the rules against self-incrimination in the Jewish 
and American legal systems.
34
  Although some have attempted to 
trace the origins of the Fifth Amendment back to antecedents in Jew-
ish law,
35
 the Court does not offer this argument, and in the view of 
most scholars, any such efforts remain tenuous at best.
36
 
In short, Miranda’s references to Jewish law are certainly signifi-
cant—and, appropriately, rely on the work of scholars of Jewish law—
but the Court’s attempt to apply these lessons from Jewish law to the 
American rule of criminal interrogation remains vulnerable to ques-
tions of relevance and methodology. 
III. GARRITY V. NEW JERSEY: AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH FOR THE 
APPLICATION OF JEWISH LEGAL THEORY IN AMERICAN LAW 
At the same time, a critique of the analysis in Miranda need not 
preclude the application of insights and lessons from Jewish law and 
legal theory within the context of the American legal system.  In fact, 
less than one year after Miranda, the Supreme Court issued another 
opinion that relied, in part, on the rule against self-incrimination in 
Jewish law as well as on a reprinted version of Rabbi Lamm’s article.
37
  
This time, however, the Court applied Jewish legal theory in a man-
ner that is more satisfying and convincing. 
In the 1967 case of Garrity v. New Jersey, the state conducted an 
investigation into alleged fixing of traffic tickets by police officers.
38
  
 
 33 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458 (emphasis added). 
 34 See, e.g., AARON KIRSCHENBAUM, SELF-INCRIMINATION IN JEWISH LAW 19–21 
(1970); LEVY, supra note 12, at 439–40 (stating that “[w]hether the existence of the 
right against self-incrimination in Talmudic law in any way influenced the rise of the 
right in Anglo-American law is an intriguing question” but concluding that “the an-
swer, if based on evidence rather than speculation, must be negative”); Arnold Enk-
er, Self-Incrimination, in JEWISH LAW AND CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 12, at 
169, 169 (“The thesis of my presentation today will be that exaggerated claims have 
been and are being made for the sources of self-incrimination in Jewish law, and for 
the notion that important lessons can be learned from Jewish [l]aw with respect to 
self-incrimination.”).  
 35 See Braz, supra note 12, at 162 (arguing that “Jewish law and Talmudic juri-
sprudence constitute one of the main streams that converged to form the unique 
common law doctrine against self-incrimination”); Horowitz, supra note 12, at 125–27 
(indicating that the source of the principle against self-incrimination lies in Talmud-
ic law). 
 36 See sources cited supra note 34.  
 37 See Lamm, supra note 30, at 1. 
 38 385 U.S. 493, 494 (1967). 
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Prior to being questioned, the officers were told that they had the 
right to refuse to answer questions on the grounds that the response 
would incriminate them, but that refusal to answer would subject 
them to removal from office.
39
  The Supreme Court focused on the 
issue of whether the responses to these questions were admissible as 
voluntary confessions.
40
 
Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas posed the issue in clear 
and stark terms, stating that “[t]he choice imposed on petitioners was 
one between self-incrimination or job forfeiture.”
41
  Relying on prior 
decisions, the Court emphasized that “[c]oercion that vitiates a con-
fession . . . can be mental as well as physical,”
42
 and “[s]ubtle pres-
sures may be as telling as coarse and vulgar ones.”
43
  The Court 
viewed the relevant question as “whether the accused was deprived of 
his ‘free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer,’”
44
  and 
found that “[t]he option to lose their means of livelihood or to pay 
the penalty of self-incrimination is the antithesis of free choice to 
speak out or to remain silent.”
45
  Therefore, the Court concluded, 
“the statements were infected by the coercion inherent in this 
scheme of questions and cannot be sustained as voluntary under our 
prior decisions.”
46
 
As in Miranda, the majority opinion in Garrity includes a foot-
note referencing Jewish law in support of the Court’s conclusion.
47
  
When compared with the footnote in Miranda, however, the discus-
sion of Jewish law in Garrity is more complete, more conceptual, in 
some ways more modest in its potential application to the American 
legal system, and, accordingly, more convincing and effective. 
The footnote in Garrity, which consists entirely of an extensive 
quotation from sections of Rabbi Lamm’s article, opens with the ac-
 
 39 Id.  
 40 Id. at 496.  
 41 Id.   
 42 Id. (quoting  Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960) (quotation marks 
omitted)).  
 43 Id. at 496 (citing Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Leyra v. Denno, 
347 U.S. 556 (1954)).  
 44 Garrity, 385 U.S. at 496 (quoting Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 241 
(1941)).  
 45 Id.  
 46 Id. at 497–98. 
 47 Id. at 497 n.5.  
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knowledgment that Jewish law and American law differ substantive-
ly—and substantially—with respect to rules of self-incrimination: 
 It should be pointed out, at the very outset, that the Halakhah 
does not distinguish between voluntary and forced confes-
sions . . . .  And it is here that one of the basic differences between 
Constitutional and Talmudic Law arises.  According to the Consti-
tution, a man cannot be compelled to testify against himself. . . .  
The Halakhah . . . does not permit self-incriminating testimony.  It 
is inadmissible, even if voluntarily offered.  Confession . . . is simp-
ly not an instrument of the Law.  The issue [in Jewish law], then, 
is not compulsion, but the whole idea of legal confession.
48
 
 In light of these basic distinctions in both the scope and the 
apparent concerns behind the limitations on confessions in Jewish 
law and American law, it seems surprising that the Garrity Court 
would derive any lessons from the absolute ban on criminal confes-
sions in the Jewish legal system.  If anything, Jewish legal theory, 
which bans confessions without any consideration of voluntariness, 
appears completely irrelevant to the Court’s analysis in Garrity, which 
turned entirely on the issue of coercion.
49
 
The Court’s reasoning becomes apparent from the remaining 
two paragraphs of the footnote.  Moving from the substance and 
scope of the rule against self-incrimination in Jewish law, the Court 
quotes Rabbi Lamm’s analysis of possible rationales underlying the 
rule.  Building on Maimonides’ insights into human psychology, 
Rabbi Lamm explains that, although the rule is a divine decree, “The 
Halakhah . . . is . . . concerned with protecting the confessant from his 
own aberrations which manifest themselves, either as completely fa-
bricated confessions, or as exaggerations of the real facts.”
50
  Drawing 
on modern psychoanalytic theory, Rabbi Lamm adds that “[w]hile 
certainly not all, or even most criminal confessions are directly attri-
butable, in whole or in part, to the Death Instinct, the Halakhah is 
sufficiently concerned with the minority of instances, where such is 
the case, to disqualify all criminal confessions and to discard confes-
sion as a legal instrument.”
51
 
Finally, the Court quotes Rabbi Lamm’s conclusion: 
 
 48 Id. (quoting Lamm, supra note 30, at 10) (emphasis added).  
 49 See id., 385 U.S. at 496–98.  
 50 Garrity, 385 U.S. at 497 n.5 (emphasis added) (quoting Lamm, supra note 30, at 
12).  
 51 Id. at 497–98 n.5 (quoting Lamm, supra note 30, at 12).  
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[T]he Constitutional ruling on self-incrimination concerns only 
forced confessions, and its restricted character is a result of its his-
torical evolution as a civilized protest against the use of torture in 
extorting confessions.  The Halakhic ruling, however, is much 
broader and discards confessions in toto, and this because of its 
psychological insight and its concern for saving man from his own 
destructive inclinations.
52
 
Although the Court does not offer any comments on Rabbi 
Lamm’s remarks, the implications derived from Jewish law are quite 
clear, adding considerable depth to the Court’s analysis.  The Court 
was not addressing the general question of whether the Constitu-
tion—or Jewish law—permits the use of self-incrimination to obtain 
evidence in a criminal case; as the Court observes, the Constitution 
admits voluntary confessions and Jewish law does not.  This substan-
tive distinction, however, was not pertinent to the issue in Garrity. 
Instead, in an effort to analyze the voluntariness of the police of-
ficers’ statements, the Garrity Court engaged in a complex considera-
tion of various forms of coercion, both blatant and subtle.  The foot-
note referencing Jewish law is offered in support of the Court’s 
assertion that “the statements were infected by the coercion inherent 
in this scheme of questioning and cannot be sustained as volunta-
ry. . . .”
53
  In fact, the footnote signal is placed in the middle of the 
sentence, modifying the word “coercion.”
54
 
Accordingly, the Court’s decision turned on the recognition 
that, for the purposes of assessing the voluntariness of a statement, 
courts must consider both physical and more subtle—but no less 
real—forms of psychological coercion.
55
  This recognition is precisely 
the insight that Rabbi Lamm, more than ten years earlier,
56
 and Mai-
monides, more than 700 years earlier,
57
 had derived from the ban on 
self-incrimination in Jewish law.  The Court in Garrity applied the 
conceptual lesson from Jewish law to support its conclusion that 
American law should likewise take into account more complex and 
subtle forms of coercion, such as the threat of losing a job, that can 
 
 52 Id. (quoting Lamm, supra note 30, at 12).  
 53 Id. at 497–98 & n.5. 
 54 See id.  
 55 Id. at 497–99. 
 56 See Lamm, supra note 30. 
 57 See Laws Concerning the Sanhedrin and the Penalties Within Their Jurisdiction, supra 
note 18. 
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impose sufficient psychological pressure as to render involuntary—
and therefore inadmissible—any ensuing confessions.
58
 
Thus, the methodology in Garrity provides a model preferable to 
the approach in Miranda on a number of grounds.  Garrity more 
clearly emphasizes the distinction between the rules of self-
incrimination in Jewish law and American law, remaining faithful to 
each legal system on its own terms.  Therefore, Garrity makes no at-
tempt at an unlikely substantive or historical reconciliation between 
the two rules.  Instead, Garrity draws a conceptual lesson from Jewish 
law in a way that accurately conveys the logic of the Jewish legal sys-
tem and then applies the lesson to American law in a way that makes 
sense within the logic of the American legal system.  As a result, the 
lessons derived from Jewish legal theory contribute depth to the 
Court’s understanding, interpretation, and determination of Ameri-
can law and legal theory. 
IV. APPLICATIONS OF JEWISH LEGAL THEORY IN AMERICAN  
LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 
To be sure, this discussion is not intended to imply a strict di-
chotomy between substantive and conceptual applications of Jewish 
law in the American legal system, or to suggest that the reference to 
Jewish law in Miranda is without value.  Instead, the contrast between 
Miranda and Garrity illustrates the broader methodological point, that 
effective application of a principle in Jewish law entails the ability to 
identify, independent of theological justifications, an underlying ra-
tionale for the principle that can be evaluated within the internal log-
ic of the American legal system.  Indeed, this methodology has been 
widely employed in American legal scholarship, resulting in a sub-
stantial body of literature dedicated to the application of Jewish legal 
theory to American legal theory. 
Much of this literature has examined substantive areas of law, in-
cluding, among others, criminal law and procedure,
59
 capital pu-
 
 58 Garrity, 385 U.S. at 497–99. 
 59 See, e.g., 1 EMANUEL B. QUINT & NEIL S. HECHT, JEWISH JURISPRUDENCE: ITS 
SOURCES AND MODERN APPLICATIONS 34–37, 44–51, 154–72 (1980); 2 EMANUEL B. 
QUINT & NEIL S. HECHT, JEWISH JURISPRUDENCE: ITS SOURCES AND MODERN 
APPLICATIONS 2–8 (1986); J. David Bleich, Jewish Law and the State’s Authority to Punish 
Crime, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 829 (1991); Moshe A. Bleich & Daniel Pollack, Search and 
Seizure in Schools: A Comparison of Historical Jewish Legal Sources and Contemporary United 
States Law, 7 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 379 (1997); Arnold N. Enker, Aspects of Inte-
raction Between the Torah Law, The King’s Law, and the Noahide Law in Jewish Criminal 
Law, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1137 (1991); Arnold N. Enker, Error Juris in Jewish Criminal 
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nishment,
60
 torts,
61
 property,
62
 tax,
63
 and commercial law.
64
  Drawing 
upon thousands of years of Jewish legal scholarship, this work relies 
 
Law, 11 J.L. & RELIGION 23 (1994); Clifford S. Fishman, The Mirror of Justice Lecture: 
“Old Testament Justice,” 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 405 (2002); Aaron Kirschenbaum, 
M’kohmah shel Ha’ohnishah B’mishpat Ha’ivri Ha’plili Perek B’hashkafah Ha’pinologist shel 
Chazal v’shel Harishohnim [The Role of Punishment in Jewish Criminal Law: A Chapter in 
Rabbinic Penological Thought], 12 TEL AVIV U. L. REV. 253 (1987), translated in 9 JEWISH 
L. ANN. 123 (1991); Levine, An Introduction to Self-Incrimination in Jewish Law, supra 
note 12; Levine, Miranda, Dickerson, and Jewish Legal Theory, supra note 12; Beth C. 
Miller, A Comparison of American and Jewish Legal Views on Rape, 5 COLUM. J. GENDER & 
L. 182 (1996); Martin H. Pritikin, Punishment, Prisons, and the Bible: Does “Old Testa-
ment Justice” Justify Our Retributive Culture?, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 715 (2006); Irene 
Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, Advice From Hillel and Shammai on How to 
Read Cases: Of Specificity, Retroactivity and New Rules, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 581 (1994); 
Irene M. Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, “Cain Rose up Against His Brother Abel and 
Killed Him”: Murder or Manslaughter?, 30 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 37 (2001); Irene 
Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, Guilt: Henry Friendly Meets the MaHaRaL of 
Prague, 90 MICH. L. REV. 604 (1991); Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 12; Irene 
Merker Rosenberg et al., Murder by Gruma: Causation in Homicide Cases Under Jewish 
Law, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1017 (2000); Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, 
“Perhaps What Ye Say Is Based Only on Conjecture”: Circumstantial Evidence, Then and Now, 
31 HOUS. L. REV. 1371 (1995); Irene Merker Rosenberg et al., Return of the Stubborn 
and Rebellious Son: An Independent Sequel on the Prediction of Future Criminality, 37 
BRANDEIS L.J. 511 (1999); Aaron M. Schreiber, The Jurisprudence of Dealing with Unsa-
tisfactory Fundamental Law: A Comparative Glance at the Different Approaches in Medieval 
Criminal Law, Jewish Law and the United States Supreme Court, 11 PACE L. REV. 535 
(1991).  
 60 See, e.g., 1 QUINT & HECHT, supra note 59, at 15–18, 34–37, 154–72; Chad Ba-
ruch, 2000 McElroy Lectures: In the Name of the Father: A Critique of Reliance upon Jewish 
Law to Support Capital Punishment in the United States, 78 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 41 
(2002); Gerald J. Blidstein, Capital Punishment—The Classic Jewish Discussion, 14 
JUDAISM 159 (1965); Steven Davidoff, A Comparative Study of the Jewish and the United 
States Constitutional Law of Capital Punishment, 3 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 93 (1996); 
Bruce S. Ledewitz & Scott Staples, Reflections on the Talmudic and American Death Penal-
ty, 6 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 33 (1993); Samuel J. Levine, Capital Punishment and Re-
ligious Arguments: An Intermediate Approach, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 179 (2000); Sa-
muel J. Levine, Capital Punishment in Jewish Law and its Application to the American Legal 
System: A Conceptual Overview, 29 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1037 (1998); Samuel J. Levine, Playing 
God: An Essay on Law, Philosophy, and American Capital Punishment, 31 N.M. L. REV. 277 
(2001); Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, Lone Star Liberal Musings on 
“Eye for Eye” and the Death Penalty, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 505; Irene Merker Rosenberg & 
Yale L. Rosenberg, Of God’s Mercy and the Four Biblical Methods of Capital Punishment: 
Stoning, Burning, Beheading, and Strangulation, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1169 (2004); Daniel A. 
Rudolph, Note, The Misguided Reliance in American Jurisprudence on Jewish Law to Sup-
port the Moral Legitimacy of Capital Punishment, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 437 (1996). 
 61 See, e.g., 1 QUINT & HECHT, supra note 59, at 41–49, 86–122, 126–38, 206–13; 2 
QUINT & HECHT, supra note 59, at 2–8, 91–144; Steven F. Friedell, Medical Malpractice 
in Jewish Law: Some Parallels to External Norms and Practices, 6 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 1 (2006); Steven F. Friedell, Nobody’s Perfect: Proximate Cause in American and 
Jewish Law, 25 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 111 (2002); Sheldon Nahmod, The Du-
ty to Rescue and the Exodus Meta-narrative of Jewish Law, 16 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 751 
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on sometimes surprising insights from the Jewish legal system to pro-
vide fresh ways of looking at American law. 
For example, in considering the perennially perplexing issue of 
capital punishment, American legal scholars have examined the Tal-
mud and other sources of Jewish law only to find a diversity of ap-
proaches, including a debate between abolitionists at one end of the 
spectrum and those advocating the deterrent value of capital pu-
nishment at the other end, with still others taking intermediate posi-
tions.
65
  These debates offer valuable conceptual discussions from a 
legal system that has addressed for millennia some of the same argu-
ments that arise in contemporary American legal discourse. 
Other scholarship applies substantive Jewish law to emerging 
and cutting-edge issues in American law.  Because Jewish law relates 
to all areas of life and all realms of human activity,
66
 it must address 
questions that arise as a result of technological advances in areas such 
 
(1999); Elie Mischel, Note, “Thou Shalt Not Go About as a Talebearer Among Thy People”: 
Jewish Law and the Private Facts Tort, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 811 (2006); Shaya 
Rochester, Note, What Would Have Seinfeld Done Had He Lived in a Jewish State? Compar-
ing the Halakhic and Statutory Duties to Aid, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 1185 (2001). 
 62 See, e.g., 1 QUINT & HECHT, supra note 59, at 41–45, 64–70, 86–88, 94–98, 104–
08, 110–19, 126–32; 2 QUINT & HECHT, supra note 59, at 115–32; Michael J. Broyde & 
Michael Hecht, The Return of Lost Property According to a Jewish & Common Law: A Com-
parison, 12 J.L. & RELIGION 225 (1995); Joshua A. Klarfeld, Note, Chazakah: Judaic 
Law’s Non-Adverse Possession, 52 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 623 (2004–2005); Ora R. Sheinson, 
Note, Lessons from the Jewish Law of Property Rights for the Modern American Takings De-
bate, 26 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 483 (2001).   
 63 See, e.g., 2 QUINT & HECHT, supra note 59, at 137–40; Adam S. Chodorow, Agri-
cultural Tithing and (Flat) Tax Complexity, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 267 (2006); Adam S. 
Chodorow, Biblical Tax Systems and the Case for Progressive Taxation, 23 J.L. & RELIGION 
51 (2007–2008); Adam S. Chodorow, Maaser Kesafim and the Development of Tax Law, 
8 FLA. TAX. REV. 153 (2007).  
 64 See, e.g., 1 QUINT & HECHT, supra note 59, at 39–41, 84–86; 2 QUINT & HECHT, 
supra note 59, at 8–32, 135–37; Dennis W. Carlton & Avi Weiss, The Economics of Reli-
gion, Jewish Survival, and Jewish Attitudes Toward Competition in Torah Education, 30 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 253 (2001); Aaron Levine, Aspects of the Lemons Problem as Treated in Jewish 
Law, 23 J.L. & RELIGION 379 (2008); Shahar Lifshitz, Oppressive-Exploitative Contracts: A 
Jewish Law Perspective, 23 J.L. & RELIGION 425 (2008); James Scheinman, Jewish Business 
Ethics, 1 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 63 (1995); Keith Sharfman, The Law and Eco-
nomics of Hoarding, 19 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 179 (2007); Shayna M. Sigman, Kosher 
Without Law: The Role of Nonlegal Sanctions in Overcoming Fraud Within the Kosher Food 
Industry, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 509 (2004); Leon Wildes, A Modern Restatement of Jewish 
Civil Law, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 2037, 2038 (1997) (book review). 
 65 See, e.g., TALMUD BAVLI: TRACTATE MAKKOS 7a1.  
 66 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
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as bioethics
67
 and intellectual property.
68
  Indeed, over thousands of 
years, the Jewish legal system has been continuously confronted with 
the ongoing challenge of applying the law to newly emerging reali-
ties.
69
  Thus, the Jewish legal model and Jewish legal history provide 
not only substantive responses to specific questions, but also a con-
ceptual framework for the broader and more universal issue of adapt-
ing a legal system to inevitable advances in science and technology. 
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supra, at 139; Daniel Pollack et al., Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hospital: 
Wrongful Living from an American and Jewish Legal Perspective, 45 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 621 
(1997); Chaim Povarsky, Regulating Advanced Reproductive Technologies: A Comparative 
Analysis of Jewish and American Law, 29 U. TOL. L. REV. 409 (1998); Steven H. Resni-
coff, Jewish Law Perspectives on Suicide and Physician-Assisted Dying, 13 J.L. & Religion 
289 (1999); Steven H. Resnicoff, Physician Assisted Suicide Under Jewish Law, 1 DEPAUL 
J. HEALTH CARE L. 589 (1997); Steven H. Resnicoff, Supplying Human Body Parts: A Jew-
ish Perspective, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 851 (2006); Daniel B. Sinclair, Assisted Reproduction 
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and Patient Autonomy in Jewish Law, 13 J.L. & RELIGION 351 (1999); Alan Mayor Soko-
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Legal, Moral, and Ethical Issues, 29 U. TOL. L. REV. 513 (1998); Marc D. Stern, “And You 
Shall Choose Life”: Futility and the Religious Duty to Preserve Life, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 
997 (1995); Miryam Z. Wahrman, Fruit of the Womb: Artificial Reproductive Technologies 
& Jewish Law, 9 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 109 (2005); Stephen J. Werber, Ancient An-
swers to Modern Questions: Death, Dying, and Organ Transplants—A Jewish Law Perspective, 
11 J.L. & HEALTH 13 (1996).  
 68 See, e.g., FROM MAIMONIDES TO MICROSOFT: THE JEWISH LAW OF COPYRIGHT SINCE 
THE BIRTH OF PRINT (Neil W. Netanel & David Nimmer eds., forthcoming 2010); Jack 
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Not surprisingly, Jewish legal theory has also played a central 
role in emerging areas of American legal scholarship that relate di-
rectly to issues of religion.  As one particularly poignant example, the 
last decade has experienced the growth of the religious lawyering 
movement, comprised of lawyers and scholars exploring the relation-
ship between religion and the practice of law.
70
  The movement has 
succeeded as an intellectual force within the legal academy in part 
due to contributions reflecting a variety of religious perspectives, in-
cluding insights from Jewish legal theory that address substantive 
areas of American legal practice, such as criminal advocacy and cor-
porate counseling, as well as conceptual approaches to the roles of 
the lawyer within the American adversary system.
71
  Notably, some of 
 
 70 See, e.g., Thomas E. Baker & Timothy W. Floyd, A Symposium Précis, 27 TEX. 
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wyering and Personal Values, 38 CATH. LAW. 145, 149 (1998) (focusing on the personal, 
religious, and other ethical values of lawyers in the legal profession); Symposium, Re-
discovering the Role of Religion in the Lives of Lawyers and Those They Represent, 26 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 821 (1999); Symposium, The Relevance of Religion to a Lawyer’s Work: 
An Interfaith Conference, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1075 (1998); Robert K. Vischer, Heretics 
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the most significant lessons are derived though careful analysis of 
Jewish law on its own terms, including exploration of ways in which 
the Jewish legal system differs, at times dramatically, from the Ameri-
can legal system.  Serving as a contrast case, the Jewish legal model 
enables American legal scholars to see the American legal system and 
American legal practice in a new light. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Along with the analysis of contributions from Jewish legal theory 
to the study of various substantive areas of American law, it may be fit-
ting to close this Essay on a more conceptual level, noting some of 
the insights Jewish legal theory continues to provide in more theoret-
ical areas of American law, such as jurisprudence,
72
 legal interpreta-
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tion,
73
 and legal narrative.
74
  Indeed, the current turn to Jewish legal 
theory in American legal scholarship may be attributed in large part 
to the contributions of Robert Cover,
75
 whose groundbreaking work, 
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[T]he publication of Cover’s work was a significant turning point in 
the growth of this new literature in American law and Judaism. . . . Ro-
bert Cover made it respectable to draw on the Jewish tradition in pub-
lic discourse.  Many of the articles citing Jewish sources in the past dec-
ade are either direct responses to Cover’s work, whether critical or 
admiring, or attempts to carry forward Cover’s intellectual project. Fi-
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particularly near the end of his life, explored a number of areas of 
American jurisprudence through a prism of Jewish law and legal 
theory.
76
 
Though Cover’s scholarship stands out in many respects, his re-
liance on Jewish law is notable, in part, for the attempt to explore 
Jewish law on its own terms.  Indeed, Cover often included his own 
translations of primary and secondary sources of Jewish law that were 
unfamiliar to most scholars of American law.
77
  As Cover acknowl-
edged, at times these sources highlighted stark differences between 
the American legal system and the Jewish legal system, in both sub-
stance and underlying assumptions.
78
  Nevertheless, Cover was able to 
identify, within Jewish legal theory, theoretical lessons and concep-
tual insights that add to our understanding of American law and legal 
thought.  Likewise, consistent with the methodology suggested in this 
Essay, scholars continue to look to sources of Jewish law on its own 
terms as a model for the application of Jewish legal theory to Ameri-
can law and legal scholarship. 
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